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1 Introduction
Despite a large literature studying what favors or hinders vertical integration between intermediate
inputs' sellers and nal goods' producers, in order to fully characterize the production process of an
input it is not sucient to state whether it is integrated or not with the downstream assembly phase,
since there are many other facets attached to inputs' production that are worth considering. In order
to add to the knowledge about rms' organizational strategies, in this paper we concentrate on the
determinants of the choice to produce a good under production to order. In production to order the
supplier waits for a specic order by a downstream buyer describing the specications of the good to be
produced, and production takes place only after the order is received. This way of organizing production
is the opposite of production for stock (which we also call production in advance) where products are
stored as inventory, and then just shipped at the orders' arrival.
Arm's-length trade through production to order diers from arm's-length trade through production
in advance. In production to order the seller knows exactly who the buyer is, and viceversa. This
allows the supplier to customize (at least to some extent) the component exactly towards the needs of
the buyer. The second peculiar feature of production to order is that, once the product is customized
for a specic buyer, the value of the component outside that relationship is considerably decreased.
This opens the way for an opportunistic behavior by the buyer. Finally, we identify a third source
of dierence between the two production modes. This stems from the presence of particularly intense
design and marketing activities in production for stock. In this case, since the nal recipient of the
good is unknown at the production stage, the supplier works out what are the most common and most
valuable product specications required by the generality of downstream rms. In doing so, he raises
the eectiveness of the component for each downstream rm, incurring at the same time design and
marketing costs.
Our analysis of the production to order choice starts from some facts that we derive from a survey of
Italian manufacturing rms.1 The rst general remark is that, even within narrowly dened industries
(4-digit NACE), there is lots of variation in the share of rms producing to order in each industry. In
Figure 1 we plot a kernel density estimation of the share of rms producing to order in 4-digit NACE
industries with at least 5 rms in our dataset.2
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The empirical density function shows that in the bulk of industries the share of rms producing to
order is high. In our dataset, only in one 4-digit industry there are no rms producing to order. We
then conclude that this mode of supplying the market is a very important feature of manufacturing
activity.
1The survey that we use is described in detail in Appendix 6.1.
2The shape of the density function does not change including also sectors with less than 5 rms.
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The other important piece of evidence that we provide concerns the positive correlation, for each
industry, between the share of rms that rely on production to order and the average degree of product
dierentiation of the goods produced.3 For each industry, we compute a measure of product dierenti-
ation through a procedure that draws on the classication by Rauch (1999).4 In Table 1 we show the
results of two related sets of regressions. In the rst two columns we regress the number of rms in each
industry that produce at least 50% of their output following a specic order on the industry's degree of
product dierentiation, using two alternative measures of product complexity. In the last two columns
we regress the average rm-level share of production to order intensity in each industry (production to
order intensity is dened as the value of output produced to order divided by the value of total output)
on the same measures of product dierentiation.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The correlation between product dierentiation and production to order is strong. The OLS esti-
mated relationship tells us that in industries where products are poorly dierentiated, the share of rms
producing to order is small. The opposite pattern is observed in industries where product dierentiation
is high. In this case, the production to order share of rms is high as well. Similar results are derived
when the dependent variable is production to order intensity. Hence data show that the likelihood of
production to order in each industry is positively related to the degree of product dierentiation.
Finally, one may wonder if there is any relationship between the likelihood of production to order
and the degree of spatial clustering of an industry. As proved in Table 2, in a simple OLS regression
of production to order (either share or intensity) on the Maurel-Sedillot (MS) index based on plant
counts,5 the coecients are not signicantly dierent from zero.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
At the aggregate industry level, the degree of spatial clustering is not correlated to the likelihood of
production to order. This means that both in highly geographically concentrated industries and in poorly
geographically concentrated industries there are high and low shares of production to order. However, if
one wants to assess whether spatial clustering alleviates opportunistic behavior, it can be misleading to
look just at the degree of spatial clustering of an industry. As we will argue below, a crucial variable to
3In the paper we use equivalently the terms product dierentiation and product complexity.
4The degree of product complexity of each industry is obtained computing the share of goods that are not sold on an
organized exchange market. In section 4 we provide more details on this procedure.
5Data on plant counts for the computation of the MS index are from the Italian Census of manufacturing rms for
2001. The spatial unit of analysis are the 686 local labor systems, while the industry classication is based on 77 industries
(see Appendix 6.2), which shrink to 73 in the regressions because we have no observations for 4 industries. We choose
the Maurel and Sedillot (1999) index, instead of the employment-based Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index, because we are
chiey interested in the role played by the number of possible buyers located close to suppliers. However, the raw evidence
we are going to present does not change ranking industries according to the Ellison-Glaeser index.
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be taken into account is the industry's degree of product complexity and relationship-specicity, since
agglomeration is expected to be benecial especially for highly dierentiated products.
Summing up, we observe the following. First, there is considerable variability among industries in
terms of the share of rms relying on production to order, but in general this share is considerably high.
Second, there exists a strong positive correlation among the degree of product dierentiation of the
industry and the likelihood of production to order. Finally, the correlation among the degree of spatial
clustering of the industry and production to order is weak.
In the paper, we also rene our empirical analysis estimating linear models for the production to
order choice.6 Estimates show that, when industries are characterized by high product dierentiation,
the likelihood of production to order is increased if rms are spatially clustered. On the contrary, spatial
clustering makes less likely that the supplier is connected to buyers through production to order when
industries are homogeneous. The picture we get is that the role of spatial clustering on production to
order crucially hinges on the degree of product dierentiation. Then, our view is that, consistently with
the raw correlations discussed above, a crucial reason explaining the increase in the share of production
to order for industries with strong product dierentiation operates through the surge of production to
order among rms that are geographically concentrated. Put concisely, strong product dierentiation
spurs the spatial clustering channel of production to order.
In order to rationalize the empirical evidence, we build a simple model where spatial clustering has
two opposite eects on the decision regarding production modes: on the one side it reduces hold-up,
thus favoring production to order, on the other it reduces design and marketing costs, thus promoting
production in advance. A priori then, the impact of spatial clustering is ambiguous. A crucial element in
production to order is the co-operative eort between the supplier and buyer in order to tailor towards
the buyer's needs the good. Co-operation, which amounts to sharing customization costs, is assumed
to be an eective strategy, and this is implemented in the model through a quadratic cost function
for customization. However, we show that only when industries are characterized by high product
dierentiation, that is only when the potential gain by sharing the adjustment of the good is large,
spatial clustering spurs production to order, and also allows a larger relationship-specic investment
in equilibrium. On the contrary, when industries are poorly dierentiated, there is little gain from
co-operation among the supplier and the buyer in the customization of the good. In this case, spatially
clustered markets are conducive of production for stock, due to low design and marketing costs.
Apart from the mitigation of transaction costs due to agglomeration, we can think of other reasons
that explain the increase in the likelihood to produce to order if rms are spatially clustered. A wide
literature stresses the relevance of communication and information ows among rms located within
clusters. The literature describing this process, especially for Italy, is really vast. See, among many
other papers, Maskell and Malmberg (1999), Capello and Faggian (2005), Lazerson and Lorenzoni
6Results are unaected estimating a probit model.
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(1999), Giuliani (2007). Firms in a district can take advantage of information and experiences gained
by others. In our case, the relevant information concerns other rms' contractual experience with
specic buyers. We label this eect as the \spillover" eect. This eect is arguably more important
in the supply of dierentiated goods, whose contracts are relatively more complex, because it allows
the rm to reduce the costs of the search for the right partner. Therefore, the spillover eect provides
another reason for expecting that agglomeration of dierentiated industries fosters production to order.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the relevant literature, while in section
3 we present a simple model that explains the choice of producing to order or producing in advance.
Section 4 presents empirical evidence supporting our ideas. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our point of departure is one of the theories reviewed in Duranton and Puga (2004): spatial clustering
might mitigate hold-up problems between buyers and sellers. If a large number of potential buyers is
located around, it is likely that the hold-up problem is less severe for suppliers. This may be the case in
big cities as opposed to smaller urban areas, or in spatial clusters of small and medium-sized rms, as in
the case of Italian industrial districts. Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2005) formally develop this line
of reasoning in a slightly dierent context. They concentrate on relationship-specic investments made
by workers. But by substituting the term \intermediate inputs' suppliers" to the term \workers" their
reasoning can be easily generalized. Interpreted in this manner, their paper proves that co-location of
rms can induce more ecient (industry-specic) investments.
Another theoretical paper in this vein is Helsley and Strange (2007). They analyze a linear space
where buyers are equally spaced. If there are transaction costs, they show that proximity between buyers
and sellers lowers transaction costs and favors disintegration of production (outsourcing). Moreover,
they also show that, as input demanders become closer to each other, their prots go up as well.
This happens because agglomeration in space mitigates hold-up risk, thus fostering a more ecient
investment by inputs' suppliers. This is named by them a \Williamsonian" agglomeration force. It
is well understood since Hotelling (1929) at least that \distance [...] is only a gurative term for a
great congeries of qualities".7 In other terms, it is just a matter of how one interprets the linear space,
since it may stand for physical space as well as characteristics' space. So, Helsley and Strange (2007)
results also show that product homogeneity (i.e., similarity in the needs of buyers which corresponds
to proximity in the linear space) favors disintegration of production and the establishment of trade
in intermediate inputs between suppliers and buyers. Under this approach, product dierentiation in
physical space and product dierentiation in the characteristics' space are just two alternative (and
mutually exclusive) ways of interpreting the model. Our paper is useful also in disentangling the role
7Quotation is from Hotelling original paper.
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played by physical space and characteristics' space upon the way of organizing production. We show
that it is crucial to consider the interaction among these two dimensions, since product dierentiation
in downstream markets aects the sign (either positive or negative) of the eect of spatial clustering on
production decisions.
Another relevant area for us of research in urban economics is the assessment of the link between
geographical concentration of industries and vertical disintegration of production. Holmes (1999) for
the U.S. and Li and Lu (2009) for China show that there is indeed a positive correlation between
geographical concentration of industries and purchased input intensity (the value of purchased inputs
divided by the value of total output). This is in line with Helsley and Strange (2007) theoretical results.
As already discussed in the introduction, instead of assessing the degree of vertical disintegration, our
paper concentrates on the determinants of the rms' mode of organizing arm's-length trade, to assess
whether it is carried out through production to order or through production in advance. From a
methodological point of view, our research question is quite similar to Holmes (1999), because we end
up regressing production to order intensity (the value of output produced to order divided by the value
of total output) on a measure of the geographic concentration of the industry. However, while Holmes
(1999) is interested in assessing if spatial clustering raises the extent to which a downstream rm buys
from upstream suppliers located nearby, we want to assess if spatial clustering raises the extent to which
an upstream rm supplies the downstream buyers located around through production to order.
Our paper relies on Rauch (1999) for the measurement of industries' product dierentiation at a very
ne level of disaggregation. In that paper, it is shown that proximity8 is more important for dierentiated
products than for homogeneous products in fostering trade in a gravity model. The second result is that
dierentiated products tend to be less traded than more homogenous products. Following his work,
some papers have also investigated how contract enforcement aects trade according the complexity of
the goods that are exchanged (see Berkowitz et al., 2006, and Ranjan and Lee, 2007). Finally, Nunn
(2007) employs Rauch classication to measure product dierentiation in upstream industries, his focus
being the relationship-specicity of upstream intermediate inputs. He nds that countries' ability to
enforce contracts is a source of comparative advantage, since countries with good contract enforcement
specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specic investments are most important.
Dierently from this line of research, our approach, more than being focused on the determinants of
aggregate volumes of trade, concentrates on the rm-level determinants of production decisions made
by individual rms. However, broadly speaking and in accordance with this line of research, also our
approach deals with the way in which product complexity and relationship-specicity aect production
decisions.
8Proximity is dened both in a geographical sense and in a cultural sense, the latter being proxied by language or
colonial ties.
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3 A simple model
3.1 Setup
We model the decision concerning how to organize production by a supplier who produces one unit of
a component for downstream rms. We imagine that each supplier is embedded in a given market. To
simplify the analysis, each supplier and the corresponding downstream market are isolated from other
suppliers/markets.
In each downstream market buyers bid a price to secure the component produced by the supplier.
The traded good can be customized in two dierent, though not mutually exclusive, manners: towards
the needs of a specic buyer and towards a market as a whole. Customization towards a specic buyer
is always needed since downstream rms dier from each other, and so they require specialized inputs.
It can be carried out by the supplier alone, by the buyer alone, or by both of them in co-operation.
Customization towards a market is an activity which can be performed only by the supplier, but it
is not always implemented. We assume that customization for the downstream market entails a design
and marketing activity whose aim is to produce the component according to the best-valued product
specications common to all potential customers. The benets of customization for the market consist
in raising the marginal value of the component, A, for each downstream rm by a constant amount
equal to u. In formal terms we have:
A =
8<:A under production to order
A+ u under production for stock
(1)
where A is the basic value of the component, and u is a measure of the eectiveness of design and
market research in raising that value.9
We also assume that the possible production modes are two, production to order and production in
advance (also called for stock). These production modes dier in terms of the customization activities
that are performed. Under production to order, there is no customization for the market, while the
supplier may share with the buyer the eort of customizing the component towards the buyer's needs.
As we argue below, this makes production to order more ecient with respect to production for stock,
though it opens the way to opportunistic behavior. Under production for stock, the component is of
higher value thanks to customization for the market, but after production takes place the buyer is left
alone in adapting the product towards her needs.10 Table 3 represents the options the supplier has in
9Assuming that the marginal product of marketing activity for the supplier, u, is positive is strictly related to similar
assumptions formulated in advertising models, as Dorfman and Steiner (1954), where the rm is able to increase gross
revenues through advertising. See also, in a dynamic setting, the notion of advertising goodwill introduced by Nerlove
and Arrow (1962). However, our notion of customization for the market also encompasses the design of the good, and so
it is somewhat dierent from the strict notion of advertising activity, since it does not involve adding new buyers for an
existing product, but rather nding the best suited specications of a product for a range of potential buyers.
10It is important to stress that this is a highly stylized framework, since we assume that design and marketing activities
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terms of production modes, and the implications for customization activities that are performed.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The sequence of choices regarding the supplier is modelled as a two-stage process: in the rst stage
(organization stage) he decides whether to produce to order or produce for the stock. In the second
stage (production stage) rms who chose to produce to order decide for which buyer to customize, and
the amount of eort to be spent for her, while rms who chose to produce in advance simply bear the
design and marketing cost.
3.2 Production stage
3.2.1 Production to order
Similarly to Grossman and Helpman (2002), we imagine the space of characteristics of the component
as a circle of radius R, with K buyers located around the circumference and equally spaced at an angle
measuring   2=K at the center of the circle. Each circle represents a separate market and is served
by a single supplier. The center of the circle corresponds to a component which is not customized for
any particular buyer. Hence, the scope for the specialization of the input is proxied by the dimension
of the circle. When R = 0, the circle reduces to a single point, there is no room for specialization, and
we have many buyers with identical needs. If R > 0, the component needs to be specialized, and the
higher it is R the bigger it is the scope for specialization. In what follows we always assume that R > 0.
As already put forward in the literature (Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud, 2005; Duranton and Puga,
2004; Helsley and Strange, 2007) spatial clustering improves outside options when the supplier-buyer
interaction is aected by hold-up. This is precisely the scenario of production to order. Since we assume
that the buyer and the supplier cannot contract over prices prior to input production, the buyer for
whom the product was customized oers a price to the supplier only when supplier's customization
costs are sunk. In doing so, the buyer tries to extract the highest possible surplus from the transaction.
Competition among buyers to secure the component leads her to oer what the buyer with the second
highest valuation is actually willing to pay. The bidding mechanism we imagine resembles that in Helsley
and Strange (2007). The expectation about this conduct leads to an inecient relationship-specic
investment by the supplier. However, downstream buyers' opportunistic behavior can be mitigated by
their degree of spatial clustering, to the extent that this raises the willingness to pay of the buyer with
the second highest valuation. Assuming that the downstream market (our circle) is spatially bounded
with respect to the supplier's location, the degree of clustering coincides with the number K of buyers
that are located around the circumference. When K is high, the downstream market is populated by
are carried out under production for stock only. Although we cannot rule out that also under production to order some
preliminary design and marketing activity is performed, we prefer to stick to a simplied framework where the traded
good under production to order is of lower intrinsic value, but where co-operation in customization for the specic buyer
guarantees a certain appeal to this production mode, at the cost of some ineciencies due to opportunism.
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many buyers, so that, given a buyer 1 for whom a component was originally designed, there is another
buyer 2 with similar needs, which is willing to oer pretty much the same price for the good produced
by the supplier.
Let us consider a simple picture to explain the model. In Figure 2 we depict a space with K = 6
buyers. The supplier customizes the product up to a length equal to i, where 0  i  R. The
supplier's eort is not directed towards a specic customer, but instead goes along the dashed line in a
direction that is a compromise between buyer 1's and buyer 2's needs. To this purpose, we introduce a
parameter, , where  2 [1=2; 1], measuring how much the supplier is deviating from the ideal direction
of customization for buyer 1. Specically, o;1 is buyer 1's willingness to pay for the component, where
o;1 = A  
 
i2 +R2   2Ri cos ((1  )) (2)
The right hand side in (2) is equal to the dierence between the basic marginal value of the input and
the adjustment cost to be paid by buyer 1. The latter is proportional to the square of the customization
distance buyer 1 has to ll in on her own, after the supplier has customized the characteristics of
the component up to a measure equal to i along a certain direction . For  = 1 the component is
customized exactly towards buyer 1, while for  = 1=2 the component is equally suitable for buyer 1
and buyer 2, provided that the same customization cost has to be paid by buyer 1 and buyer 2 in order
to make the component t their needs. The cost proportionality parameter is , and it will turn to be
a key determinant of the equilibrium production mode. We provide further interpretation for it below.
Obviously, when there is no customization by the supplier (i=0), the willingness to pay of the buyer is
the lowest possible one.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
After the component has been produced, buyer 1, entering in a contractual relationship with the
supplier, adopts an opportunistic behavior. As a result, the supplier having customized the product for
buyer 1 is oered as a price for the component only what buyer 2 is willing to pay, o;2, equal to
o;2 = A  
 
i2 +R2   2Ri cos()
where the second term on the right-hand side represents the adjustment cost that buyer 2 has to incur.
Generally speaking, when the supplier produces to order he knows that he will be oered only what
the second closest buyer is willing to pay. In Figure 2, the supplier customizes (although partially) the
product more towards the needs of buyer 1, and so the distance that has to be lled by buyer 2 (the
second closest buyer) is
p
i2 +R2   2Ri cos(), a function of , the exogenous distance among two
consecutive buyers around the circumference, and , the chosen direction of customization.
The supplier's prots under production to order thus depend on two endogenous variables: the
relationship-specic investment, i, and the direction of customization between two consecutive buyers,
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. We indicate supplier's prots through the symbol o(i; ), so that we can write
o(i; ) = o;2   i2 = A  
 
i2 +R2   2Ri cos()  i2 (3)
In (3) we assume that the supplier's customization costs are, similarly to those encountered by the
buyer, proportional to the square of the specialization distance lled, i. By an appropriate choice of
units, we normalize the proportionality parameter for the supplier's customization costs to 1. Therefore,
 measures the relative buyer's customization cost compared to that of the supplier. When  is close to
zero the buyer's cost of adjusting the product is negligible, while, as  goes up, the cost for the buyer
increases with respect to the one aorded by the supplier. In a sense, when  is small it does not really
matter for whom the product was initially designed, since a buyer can very easily use an input that was
designed for someone else, or she can use an input even not specialized at all (i = 0). As  increases,
the buyer's customization activity becomes more and more costly. Hence, in our framework,  captures
the intensity of the loss in the value of the component due to imperfect specialization. As  goes up, it
becomes increasingly more important that the component is strongly specialized by the supplier at the
production stage, since it is more costly to change or adapt product specications afterwards.
The optimal relationship-specic investment, i, that maximizes the supplier's prots, taking for the
moment as given a certain direction of customization, , then solves the problem8><>:
max
i
o(i; ) = A  
 
i2 +R2   2Ri cos()  i2
s.t. i  0
and the solution is 8><>:
i = R cos(2=K)

1 + 
; if K > 4
i = 0; if K  4
Proposition 1. The optimal level of relationship-specic investment i is non-decreasing in: market
thickness, K, the radius of the circumference, R, and the relative cost of adjustment, . No relationship-
specic investment is undertaken if the number of buyers is small (equal or less than 4). Moreover, the
supplier always performs only partial customization (i < R).
Focusing on the role played by , our simple modelling of the production to order stage gives rise
to the following results:
1. When  = 0, there is no relationship-specic investment (i = 0), independently of the thickness
of the downstream market;
2. When  > 0, there is relationship-specic investment (i > 0) only if K > 4.
The intuition for the corner solution when  = 0 is that there is no rationale for the supplier's eort,
since it only brings in an extra cost provided that the buyer can adjust the component for free. Since
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the loss in imperfect customization is nil, the component's value is the same for each buyer ( A), and
is independent of i and . In such a case, without undertaking previously any design and marketing
activity, the supplier will sell the product to some buyer, but he will not customize the product for her.
For  > 0, in order to have some customization activity from the supplier, a suciently dense
downstream industry is required. If K  4, it is better not to customize at all the product for any
particular customer, because, once the supplier enters a production to order relationship with a buyer,
the outside option is unattractive. Finally, notice that i is strictly increasing in the cost parameter
 for K > 4. The interpretation of this result is that, when  goes up, the supplier nds optimal to
increase the specialization eort i, in order to reduce buyers' customization cost, and, ultimately, to
increase the revenue he will get from the sale of the component. It is interesting to note that also i=R
is increasing in . This means that, also relatively to the total distance R that has to be lled, the
supplier increases his investment when  goes up. So, a higher intensity in the loss due to imperfect
customization motivates a higher relationship-specic investment.
Going backwards, the supplier, as a rst step, makes also a decision concerning the optimal direction
of customization , provided that  > 0, and K > 4. The maximization problem is solved substituting
back into the prot function the optimal relationship specic investment, i, which is a function of 
itself, so that the problem becomes8><>:
max

o(i
; ) = A    i2 +R2   2Ri cos()  i2
s.t. 1=2    1
The derivative of the prot function o(i
; ) with respect to  turns to be always negative if K > 4.
Then, the solution of the problem corresponds to the corner solution  = 1=2. The choice of the
supplier is to make buyer 1 and buyer 2 equally willing to pay for the component, so to maximize the
price received. Hence, the ideal direction of customization is the one equally distant from two consecutive
buyers, and is associated to a relationship-specic investment equal to i = R cos(=K)=(1 + ).11
Proposition 2. The optimal direction of customization is the one equally distant from two consecutive
buyers around the circle,  = 1=2.
3.2.2 Production for stock
Under production for stock, there is no customization towards a specic customer, and consequently
no relationship-specic investments. Through design and marketing activities, the supplier raises every
11For  going to innity, the limit of i is
lim
!1
i = R cos
 
K

which is equal to one of the legs of a right triangle, where the hypotenuse is the radius, and the other leg is the distance
lled by the buyer. Actually, when  is too high the customization activity becomes too costly for the buyer, and so the
component will not be traded. However, computing this limit is noteworthy since it allows us to state that, conditionally
on production to order being chosen, the customization distance lled by the buyer is always decreasing in .
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buyer's willingness to pay by an amount equal to u. Design and marketing are assumed to be costly
activities. However, the magnitude of these costs dier according to the number of buyers in the
downstream market. We assume that design and marketing are cheap where there are many potential
buyers around, and expensive for markets with few customers. The idea is that, when only a few buyers
populate the market, it is very costly to search for them and interview them to learn what is the most
valuable product for them. Hence, a dierence in terms of the number of potential buyers translates into
a dierence in the cost of customization for the market. Through this line of reasoning, a large number
of potential buyers K, associated to a high degree of spatial clustering, reduces design and marketing
costs. In formal terms, we indicate them as m(K), with @m()=@K < 0.12 As a result, prots under
production for stock are:
a = A+ u  R2  m(K) (4)
As (4) makes clear, also under production for stock the component needs to be customized, but the
whole specialization eort has to be carried out by the buyer. Through this channel, the parameter ,
which represents product complexity, aects prots also under production in advance. Ceteris paribus, a
lower  increases supplier's prots, because the component produced for the stock can be easily adapted
by the buyers and this increases their willingness to pay for it. On the other side, a large  provokes a
signicant prot's loss.
3.3 Organization stage
In the rst stage the upstream rm chooses the production mode. After the substitution of the equilib-
rium values of i and , the supplier's production to order prots are
o(i
; ) = A+
R22 cos2(=K)
1 + 
  R2 (5)
The supplier compares these prots with the prots he could get by producing in advance. Therefore,
the supplier decides to produce to order, and the indicator variable for production to order Ord equals
1, if the latent variable, , dened as the dierence in prots under the two production modes, is
positive:
Ord = 1,   o(i; )  a  0 (6)
If K > 4, the latent variable can be written as:
 =
R22 cos2(=K)
1 + 
  u+m(K) (7)
12Another possible assumption would be that the benets of design and marketing are increasing in the number of
potential buyers, u0(K) > 0, keeping at the same time the associated costs, m, to be xed and independent from K. The
qualitative nature of our results would not change.
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The rst term on the right-hand side is always positive, it is increasing in  and K, and pushes
towards production to order. It represents the surplus in the relationship deriving from the fact that
under production to order the supplier and the buyer share the specialization eort and its associated
costs. Under production to order, the buyer bears only a part of the total specialization required, R. The
supplier performs a specialization eort corresponding to i, while the remaining part, corresponding
to the distance
p
i2 +R2   2Ri cos(=K), is borne by the buyer. Specialization costs turn out to be
smaller if the two parties separately bear a fraction of them. This is straightforward for the case   1,
but it turns out to be true also when 0 <  < 1. Actually, as  shrinks below 1, customization carried
out by the supplier, i, becomes more expensive than customization by the buyer, but this eect is oset
by the simultaneous decrease in the equilibrium level of i: in other terms, as  shrinks, the supplier's
relationship-specic investment i decreases rapidly enough in order to guarantee that, overall, the cost
for customizing the component is always less if the two parties co-operate in the customization activity.
However, as  goes down, this term decreases since it is monotone in  and, in the limit, it approaches
zero when  does.
The rst term also goes up as the number of downstream rms, K, increases.13 This occurs because
an increase in the market thickness reduces the scope for opportunistic behavior, and raises the optimal
relationship investment of the supplier, i, which is benecial to the cost eectiveness of production to
order with respect to production for stock.
The second term, u, is the marginal benet of design and marketing, while the third one, m(K),
represents the associated costs. For the model to be meaningful, we need to assume that u > m(K).
The higher the design and marketing benets are with respect to costs, the more likely it is that the
supplier will choose production in advance. The costs m(k) are assumed to be decreasing in K. This
part of the latent variable depends again on the mass of potential customers in the downstream market.
When the degree of clustering is high, design and marketing costs are low, and this comes up against
production to order.
Summing up, the mass of rms K (our proxy for the degree of spatial clustering) has opposite
eects in (7). On the one side, it makes hold-up less severe and production to order more likely, on
the other it decreases design and marketing costs, in so fostering production for stock. A higher K
makes production to order more desirable only in sectors where customization activities performed by
the buyers are expensive enough relative to customization undertaken by the supplier; that is, only is
sectors where  is large enough.
13Dierentiating the rst term in (7) with respect to K we get
2R22 sin(=K) cos(=K)
K2(1 + )
> 0:
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4 Relationship-specicity, spatial clustering and production to
order choice: Further evidence from Italian data
Through (7), the parameters  andK impact on the equilibrium production mode. We already discussed
that  parameterizes the cost borne by the buyer due to imperfect customization performed by the
supplier. As such, this feature is industry-specic, and common to each good belonging to the same
industry. Looking for real word counterparts of , we think that the best way to capture it is through
the complexity of products. When traded components are complex we have a large , signalling the
diculty in the adjustment of the component after it has been produced. A buyer will be forced to
work hard to adapt the characteristics to her own needs, if customization has not been completed
during the production stage of the component. Even worse, in some cases it could be simply impossible
to adapt to the buyer's needs a component. On the contrary, when complexity is low, the loss due
to imperfect specialization is negligible ( is small), since the required product specications are not
very sophisticated. In our empirical applications, the complexity of a product is captured indirectly
through the existence or not of an organized exchange market where the product is traded, following
the classication proposed by Rauch (1999). When an organized exchange market exists, the product's
complexity is necessarily low.
There is another determinant of the equilibrium production mode: suppliers dier from each other
according to the degree of spatial clustering of potential buyers in the downstream market they serve.
In our simple model, clustering is exogenous, and captured by the parameter K.
The qualitative implications of our model can be condensed in Table 4, where we provide a taxonomy
for the equilibrium production mode chosen by the supplier, according to the level of product dieren-
tiation in the industry (capturing ), and to the spatial clustering of buyers in the market (capturing
K).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4.1 Estimation strategy
This section presents our strategy to measure the impact of clustering and product complexity on the
production to order choice by the rms.14
In order to identify whether a rm produces to order or for the stock, and the share of each pro-
duction mode relative to total output, we employ question E2 in the UniCredit surveys.15 We also
14As discussed above, from a methodological point of view, our baseline regressions are related to the approach pioneered
by Holmes (1999), where it is established whether spatial clustering raises the extent to which a downstream rm buys
from upstream suppliers located nearby. But dierently from Holmes (1999) we want to assess if spatial clustering raises
the extent to which an upstream rm supplies the downstream buyers located around through production to order. We
include a detailed description of the dataset, the dependent variable and the controls in the Appendix 6.1.
15See again the Appendix 6.1.
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have information on whether the supplier is selling its product to other rms, to retailers or to nal
consumers. This information is retrieved through the question E1. By looking at this question, we can
infer if the rm produces predominantly an intermediate input (direct sales to other rms), or if the rm
sells predominantly nal goods (sales to families or retailers shops). We restrict our empirical analysis
to the sample of rms that sell at least 30% of their output to other rms; that is, we select those rms
for which the sum of shares in questions E1.9 and E1.10 is at least 30%. We also use as an alternative
sample selection criterion a share of sales to other rms that equals at least 50%.
The baseline dependent variable is POIgij , measuring production to order intensity (the value of
output produced to order divided by the value of total output) of rm i in industry j in geographic unit
g. We also consider another specication where the dependent variable is a dummy, Ordgij , which takes
value one if rm i in industry j in local area g reports to have produced following an order at least 30%
(alternatively 50%) of the output. In other terms, Ordgij is a dummy indicating that POI is at least
30% (alternatively 50%).
The variable we use in our regressions to capture geographic concentration of the industry is a
dummy, Clustgj , which is equal to 1 if industry j in the geographic unit g is spatially clustered, and
zero otherwise. To compute such a dummy we use the so-called location quotient (see, for example,
Freedman, 2008) capturing the degree of agglomeration of a particular industry in a certain geographic
unit. In our case, the geographic units are local labor system (LLS hereafter).16 For each rm, the
location quotient (LQ hereafter) is computed comparing the concentration of industry j at the level
of the LLS g where the establishment is located to that of the industry at the corresponding regional
level.17 In formal terms, the LQ for a rm belonging to industry j and LLS g is equal to
LQgj =
Egj =Eg
Ej=E
=
Egj =Ej
Eg=E
;
where Egj is the number of establishments in industry j in the LLS g where the rm is located, Eg is
the number of establishments in all manufacturing industries in the LLS g, Ej is the number of estab-
lishments in industry j in the region where the rm is located, E is the total number of manufacturing
plants in the region. The variable LQgj is larger than one when the concentration of industry j in the LLS
is higher than the concentration at the regional level. It is less than one in the opposite case. Another
interpretation is that LQgj is greater than one when the LLS's share of industry j's establishments with
respect to the total number of j establishments at the regional level is greater than the corresponding
share for total manufacturing establishments. Our spatial clustering dummy Clustgj takes value one if
LQgj is greater than a certain threshold and zero otherwise. We use as thresholds three dierent values:
the median of the distribution of non-zero location quotients, the 75th percentile of the distribution of
non-zero location quotients, and the value 1. Data about establishments by geographic units (LLS and
16Italy is divided in 686 local labor systems. Local labor systems are dened by the Italian Statistical Institute using
workers' patterns for daily commuting and residential location.
17Italy is divided in 20 regions, so, on average, each region contains 34 LLS.
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regions) and industries are retrieved from the Census, and are measured with reference to October 22,
2001.18 Obviously, the value of the LQ and Clust variables depend on the partitions that are chosen for
geographic units and industries. As far as our choice of LLS is concerned, this geographic unit is quite
common to measure local phenomena (see, for example, Koenig, 2009). As for the industry partitioning,
we use a classication consisting of 77 dierent manufacturing industries. In Appendix 6.2 we explain
the procedure we adopted and the logic underlying it. Additionally, to check the robustness of our
results, we also adopt a standard 2-digit NACE classication, which groups the whole manufacturing
sector in 22 dierent industries.
To measure product complexity and relationship-specicity in the transactions that suppliers under-
take with buyers, in a way which is quite similar to Nunn (2007), we construct a variable called zj . In
order to construct such a measure, we use the industry classication developed by Rauch (1999). Based
on the nature of the transactions of the goods in the industry, each of the 1,189 sectors of the 4-digit
SITC Rev. 2 classication is assigned to one of the following three categories: sold on a standardized
exchange market; sold with a reference price; neither of the two. Rauch develops two classications
using, respectively, a conservative, and a more liberal criterion for the assignments. Following this dis-
tinction, we derive two measures of contractual intensity, a conservative measure, and a liberal measure.
We then assign each of the 1,189 SITC industries to one of the 77 sectors, or, alternatively, to one of
the 22 2-digit NACE sectors, depending on the level of aggregation we work with. For each of these
J industries, where J = 77 or J = 22, we nally build the variable zj that captures the fraction of
SITC industries in a certain industry j that is not traded on an organized exchange market. Clearly,
the higher it is zj , the higher it is average products' complexity and relationship-specicity in industry
j, since organized exchange markets are unt to trade dierentiated products. In Table 5 we provide
summary statistics for the main variables of interest across all rms included in the sample.19
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In the rst model that we estimate the conditional expectation of POI is specied as follows:
E(POIgij jClustgj ; zj ; Shareg; Xi; j ; g) = 0+1Clustgj +2Clustgj zj+3Shareg zj+X 0i4+j+g
(8)
In this linear model, Clustgj is interacted with zj in order to allow the eect of geographical concen-
tration to vary by industry. Shareg is the share of all manufacturing establishments located in LLS g
out of the region's total number of manufacturing plants. The higher it is Shareg, the higher it is the
18As explained with greater detail in Appendix 6.1, we pool observations from two separate waves of the UniCredit
Survey, so that each rm-level observation is measured with reference to the year 2000 or the year 2003. The fact that
Census data were collected as of mid 2001 is extremely convenient for us, because in this manner the LQ variable is equally
suitable to capture geographical concentration in both waves, and on this basis we can pool observations from the 8th and
9th wave of the UniCredit Survey, while still using the same clustering regressor for both of them.
19Remember that we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of rms that sell al least 30% of their output to other rms.
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concentration of the overall manufacturing activity in the LLS. The interaction between this variable
and zj , in addition to the xedeects at the level of each LLS (g), controls for the dierential impact by
level of industry dierentiation of the degree of geographical concentration of the whole manufacturing
sector.
Xi is a set of rm level controls, that includes the logs of age, age squared, size, labor productivity,
20
capital intensity, skill intensity, and dummies for whether or not the rm is an exporter or belongs to a
business group. In the econometric model, xed eects at the level of each LLS (g), and industry (j)
are included.
Another set of estimates relies on the following linear probability model:21
Prob(Ordgij = 1jClustgj ; zj ; Shareg; Xi; j ; g) = 0+1Clustgj+2Clustgjzj+3Sharegzj+X 0i4+j+g
(9)
where the continuous POI measure is replaced by the Ord dummy described above.
On the basis of the predictions derived from the model presented in section 3, we expect the coecient
on the clustering dummy, 1, to be negative. By contrast, when product complexity and relationship-
specicity is high, being located in LLS where the industry is spatially clustered, so that suppliers are
surrounded by many buyers, reduces the ineciencies due to opportunistic behavior if rms choose to
produce to order. Thus, we expect the coecient of the interaction term to have a positive sign, 2 > 0.
Our model provides an unbiased estimate of the key coecients under the assumption that there are
no omitted variables that simultaneously aect the location choice and the choice to produce to order.
We take several steps to mitigate this potential problem. First, through the inclusion of geographic
area and industry xed eects, we make sure that our key variables are not capturing the eect of other
location or sector-level variables. Second, our model controls for many rm's characteristics that might
be correlated with production to order propensity. Third, we can conclude that the dependence of
production to order on spatial clustering in a given industry does not operate through the concentration
of the whole manufacturing sector in a certain LLS: in our approach the eect on production to order
of the geographic concentration of manufacturing is netted out by the variable Shareg  zj , and by the
spatial xed eects g.
However, we admit that our research strategy does not denitively address the issue of the potential
endogeneity of geographic localization of a particular industry in a particular LLS, primarily because it
is hard to nd a suitable instrumental variable for the location of specic industries in specic areas.22
20In unreported regressions we also experimented with total factor productivity according to Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) as a control, in place of labor productivity. Results were not aected.
21Results discussed with regard to the linear probability model are robust if we use a nonlinear model such as the probit.
22In Li and Lu (2009), replicating the empirical strategy of Holmes (1999) for the case of China, the causality issue
is addressed instrumenting China's geographic concentration by industry/region in 2002 with the population of China's
regions in 1920. We could have adopted a similar instrument for Italian LLS. However, since this instrumental variable
varies only by local area, and is constant across industries belonging to the same geographic unit, the tted values from
the rst stage do so. Hence, with this IV strategy, we could have provided only evidence for a causal eect of the overall
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4.2 Estimation results
Table 6 presents our baseline results.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The dependent variable is POI. In columns from (1) to (3) the clustering dummy takes value one
when the LQ is greater than the median of the distribution of non-zero location quotients (1.065), in
column (4) the threshold is set at the 75th percentile of the distribution of non-zero location quotients
(1.803), and in column (5) the threshold equals one. In column (1) we rst show that the Clust dummy
per se is not correlated with the propensity to produce to order (we include xed eects for LLS and
industries). This is consistent with the raw evidence we presented regarding the sectoral MS indices,
and it is also consistent with our theory, where spatial clustering in the industry has an ambiguous
eect on production to order, provided that it crucially depends on the level of the complexity of the
intermediates traded in the industry.
Column (2) shows that, in industries where all the transactions occur on organized exchange markets,
clustering reduces on average POI by 46 percentage points, but raises it by 3 percentage points in
sectors where products are never traded on organized exchange markets.23 This is consistent with our
theoretical predictions, 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. One concern is that some omitted factors might drive
the relation between our key explanatory variables and the mode of production. Thus, in column (3)
we show that the results of the baseline specication are robust to the inclusion of the set of control
variables described above. We notice that production to order is more likely in smaller and less capital
intensive rms.
In columns (4) and (5), we run similar regressions with a dierent clustering dummy, that now takes
value one if LQ is greater than the 75th percentile of the distribution of non-zero LQ (column (4)),
and greater than 1 (column (5)). These regressions consistently support our theoretical predictions, and
emphasize that the impact of spatial clustering on production to order intensity crucially depends on
the degree of product complexity.
4.3 Robustness checks
In Table 7 we perform several robustness checks.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
concentration of economic activity. As noticed in the main text, our focus is not on the impact of the overall concentration
of economic activity in a given geographic unit, which is netted out in our estimates, but on the impact of the concentration
of a certain industry in a certain geographic unit.
23The threshold value of zj that makes positive the impact of Clust is 0.942. In our sample, there are 3,240 rms that
belong to industries with a value of zj that is higher than this threshold, while 275 rms belong to industries characterized
by a zj that is lower than this threshold.
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In columns (1) and (2) we introduce as a dependent variable the Ord dummy, which is equal to
one if POI is at least 30% and 50%. Results are unaected, since spatial clustering reduces on average
the likelihood of production to order by more than 40% if goods belonging to the industry are traded
exclusively on organized exchange markets, but raises it by roughly 3% for sectors that are completely
dierentiated.
In column (3) we check whether results are robust to considering the Rauch liberal classication.
Results are qualitatively the same, even if the estimated impact is smaller than in the case of the
conservative measure, and the statistical signicance of coecients is lower as well.
An issue that should be kept in mind is that our sample is non-random, since it follows a stratied
design.24 In column (4), in order to account for the stratied nature of the sample, we weight each
observation by the square root of the original sampling weight, according to the estimator proposed by,
among others, Hausman and Wise (1981).25
In column (5) we include in the sample only those rms that sell at least 50% of their output to
other rms. This is a more restrictive criterion than the 30% threshold employed throughout the paper,
so the number of observations shrinks. Results do not change.
Finally, in Table 8 we prove that our ndings are also robust to the industrial classication we
employ. In the Table we show the coecients of a regression of our three dependent variables (POI and
the two Ord dummies, computed at the 30% and 50% thresholds respectively) on Clust and on zj (for
both the conservative and the liberal classication), if industries are classied in accordance to 2-digit
NACE (for this reason the total number of industries shrinks from 77 to 22). Results are qualitatively
the same as before, even if coecients are smaller in magnitude.26
[Insert Table 8 about here]
5 Conclusions
In this paper we discuss the choice of whether to produce after a specic order is placed by a buyer or
to produce in advance for the market. First, we describe to what extent production to order is dierent
from production for stock. Second, we single out two important features that aect the choice of the
production mode: the rst is the degree of spatial clustering, which captures the thickness of the local
market where the producer operates, the second is the degree of product complexity and relationship-
specicity. We build a simple model and show that the qualitative nature of the impact of spatial
24See Appendix 6.1 about the stratication procedure adopted in the UniCredit surveys.
25See Wooldrige (2001).
26It is important to stress that in the case of 2-digit NACE we are facing a severe aggregation bias. For example, as
documented in Table 5, the minimum for zj equals 0.325 under the 77-industries classication, while it raises to 0.620 for
2-digit NACE. This is clearly the sign that, in the transition from 77 to 22 industries, rather homogeneous industries are
being aggregated with more dierentiated ones. The estimates under 2-digit NACE should be taken with more caution
than our baseline ones.
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clustering on the type of production critically depends on the degree of product complexity. In particular,
our framework shows that an increase in the degree of spatial clustering pushes toward production to
order in sectors where the loss due to imperfect customization is high, and product complexity is strong.
We nd the opposite eect in relatively homogenous sectors, where it is not valuable for buyers that
the supplier undertakes relationship-specic customization activities. The main insight that generates
this result is that higher spatial clustering increases supplier's prots in both modes of production, but
the positive impact on prots deriving from production to order prevails in sectors where customization
activities that have to be performed by the buyers induce a large loss in the component's value, and so
it becomes convenient for the supplier to engage in relationship-specic investments to reduce that loss.
We provide empirical support to these results, testing our predictions on a large dataset of Italian
manufacturing rms. We proxy spatial clustering with a binary indicator derived from the location
quotient of industries in Italian local labor systems, while the degree of product complexity is obtained
indirectly looking at whether the products belonging to the industry are traded or not on an orga-
nized exchange market. Depending on the specication we use, clustering decreases the probability of
producing to order by roughly 40 percentage points for suppliers that sell in industries where all the
transactions occur on organized exchange markets, and increases it by 3 percentage points for suppliers
selling in industries where no organized exchange market exists.
In conclusion, we have provided the rst attempt we are aware of to shed light on the link between
the choice of producing to order or in advance and spatial clustering. While we argued that geographic
concentration of industries and product complexity are important elements in this decision, we believe
that further work will be necessary to improve our understanding on the prevalence of each produc-
tion mode. In particular, we think that a particularly promising area of research is the study of the
link between spatial clustering, design and marketing activities on the one side, and the choice of the
production mode on the other. Even if we touched upon these issues in our theoretical section, our
empirical part has been rather silent on that, essentially due to the unavailability of relevant data.
6 Appendix
6.1 The dataset
The micro data set we use for this paper comes from pooling together the 8th and 9th waves of \Indagine
sulle imprese manifatturiere" (Survey on manufacturing rms), which were carried out by Mediocredito
Centrale, now incorporated into UniCredit Group, one of the largest Italian banks. The quality and
reliability of the dataset is documented by the fact that papers employing this Survey have already been
published in peer-reviewed journals (see Angelini and Generale, 2008, and Benfratello et al., 2009).
Each wave is representative of the universe of Italian rms in manufacturing. Firms in each wave are
sampled with a stratied method: 80 strata are dened, based on geographical area (4 areas in Italy),
Pavitt sectoral classication, and 5 size classes. The size of each stratum follows the Neyman sampling
procedure. In doing so, each stratum is assigned a weight with respect to the universe. This allows us
to run regressions where each observation in the sample is weighted according to its sampling weight as
reported in the UniCredit dataset.
About half of the rms in the 8th wave (1998-2000) are dropped in the 9th wave (2001- 2003), with
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other new rms being added. The choice of rms to be dropped from the 8th wave, and of those to be
added in the 9th wave is random, but the stratied nature of the sample is maintained. The original
data set contains information for 4,680 rms during 1998-2000 (8th wave) and 4,178 rms during 2001-
2003 (9th wave). The number of rms present in both waves is 2,097. Pooling the two datasets, we
retrieve observations for some 6,761 dierent rms (4,178 rms from the 9th wave, plus 2,583 rms from
the 8th wave that were not included in the 9th wave). It is important to stress that even if a rm is
sampled in both waves, it is counted only as a single observation in our estimates, provided that the
other observation is dropped. We end up with a cross-section of roughly 3,500 rms, because out of
6,761 units we keep only those rms that are selling most of their output to other rms.
The survey contains a detailed description of rms' labor force composition, investment and innova-
tion activity, internationalization strategies, production choices, nancing choices, etc. In addition, the
data set includes balance sheet information for each of the years covered.
We adopt a trimming procedure that consists in agging observations with an extreme growth rate
for any of the following variables: value added, capital, number of white collars (i.e. skilled labor),
number of blue collars (i.e. unskilled labor). We do not ag observations with extreme values in the
growth rate of intermediates' consumption. In particular, we consider a growth rate as an extreme one
if it belongs to the upper (99.5%) and bottom (0.05%) tails of the corresponding distribution across the
rms in the panel, for a given couple of years. For example, observations for the years 2002 and 2003
are agged if the growth rate in value added between 2002 and 2003 belongs to the bottom 0.5% of
the distribution, or if it belongs to the upper 99.5% of the distribution. We also consider the following
rm-level controls:
Age: Age of the rm in 2000 (8th wave) or 2003 (9th wave).
Exporter: Dummy variable indicating whether the rm is an exporter.
Size: The size measure we use is the total number of employees, including entrepreneurs and manage-
ment.
Labor productivity: Average value added per employee.
Capital intensity: Total assets divided by size (as dened above).
Skill intensity: The share of white collars over the total number of employees (size variable). White
collars are entrepreneurs, managers, and clerks.
Belongs to a group (group): Dummy variable indicating whether the rm belongs to a business group.
6.1.1 Questions employed from the UniCredit Surveys
Here we report the two main questions (E1, E2) regarding distribution channels and production choices
that we use from the surveys. The questions here refer to the 9th wave, so the relevant year is 2003.
Firms in the 8th wave were asked the same questions, but the reference year was 2000.
E1. Having normalized to 100 the total revenues in the year 2003, state the percentage share for each
type of distribution channel:
 E1.1. Modern national distribution channels (including: hypermarkets, department stores, cash
& carry, hard discount, specialized retail stores);
 E1.2. Modern foreign distribution channels (including: hypermarkets, department stores, cash &
carry, hard discount, specialized retail stores);
 E1.3. Sales to franchising rms;
 E1.4. Intermediaries specialized in goods for households;
 E1.5. Intermediaries specialized in goods for rms;
 E1.6. Small retailers;
 E1.7. Direct sales to households (not through electronic commerce);
 E1.8. Direct sales to households through electronic commerce;
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 E1.9. Direct sales to rms (not through electronic commerce);
 E1.10. Direct sales to rms through electronic commerce;
 E1.11. Other customers.
E2. Having normalized to 100 the total revenues in the year 2003, state the percentage share for each
type of selling:
 E2.1. Selling of goods produced under an order placed by the buyer;
 E2.2. Selling of goods produced by the rm on its own.
6.2 The industrial classications
In this paper we use an industrial classication which is based on 77 industries. The concordance
between our classication and the NACE Rev. 1 is provided in Table 9.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
The industrial classication that we adopt is the same employed by the UK Oce for National
Statistics in the Input-Output tables. The reason for adopting such a classication is the following.
Our paper deals with the trade of intermediates occurring within industries, and we need to dene an
industry partitioning which is broad enough so to encompass a high share of within-industry trade of
intermediates, but which is at the same time detailed enough so to allow between-industry variation in
relationship-specicity and product complexity. We solved this trade-o relying on the same classica-
tion that the UK Oce for National Statistics employs in the Input-Output Use tables. For example,
according to our classication and the 2002 UK Use tables (Italian Input-Output tables are not publicly
available at this level of disaggregation) the average within-industry share of total intermediates' trade
amounts to 36.8%. This means that, on average, 36.8% of the value of traded intermediates is taking
place among suppliers and buyers belonging to the same industry.
However, in the paper we also use the more standard 2-digit NACE, based on 22 dierent industries,
in order to be sure that our results are robust to the industrial classication employed. In the case
of 2-digit NACE, Italian Input-Output Use tables are publicly available. From them we learn that, at
this level of disaggregation, for the year 2002 the average within-industry share of total intermediates'
consumption amounts to 48.2%. In the case of UK tables, the average within-industry share of interme-
diates trade for 2002 at 2-digit NACE level amounts to 50.5%. As expected, the higher the aggregation
level, the higher the share of within-industry trade that is captured. However, the higher it is the
aggregation level, the less precise it is our measure of the industries' degree of relationship-specicity,
since homogeneous industries are aggregated with more dierentiated ones. See also footnote 26 about
this aggregation issue.
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimation of the share of rms producing to order, within 4-digit NACE
industries with at least 5 rms in our dataset.
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Figure 2: The characteristics' space with 6 downstream buyers, equally spaced with an angle measuring 
at the center, in a circumference of radius R. The supplier is making along the dashed line a relationship-
specic investment which is closer to buyer 1's needs than buyer 2's needs (1=2 <  < 1), although
specialization is incomplete (i < R).
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Table 1: Production to order (share and intensity) and product dierentiation across industries
Product to order share Production to order intensity
zj;con zj;lib zj;con zj;lib
Product dierentiation 0.533 0.434 0.533 0.426
(0.168) (0.120) (0.160) (0.115)
Number of obs. 73 73 73 73
R2 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.16
Note: In the rst two columns the dependent variable is the share of rms producing to order at least
50% of output in each industry. In the last two columns the dependent variable is the average of rms'
production to order intensity (value of output produced to order divided by the value of total output)
in each industry. We employ as regressor either Rauch's conservative classication (zj;con) or Rauch's
liberal one (zj;lib). *** denotes signicance at the 1 per cent level.
Table 2: Production to order (share and intensity) and spatial concentration across industries
Product to order share Production to order intensity
MS concentr. index 0.284 0.004
(0.918) (0.009)
Number of obs. 73 73
R2 0.00 0.00
Note: In the rst column the dependent variable is the share of rms producing to order at least 50% of
output in each industry. In the last column the dependent variable is the average of rms' production to
order intensity (value of output produced to order divided by the value of total output) in each industry.
We employ as regressor the MS concentration index based on plants' counts.
Table 3: Production modes and customization activities
Cust. for a specic buyer Cust. for the market
Production POSSIBLE CO-OPERATION ABSENT
to Order BTW. SUPPLIER AND BUYER
Production PERFORMED BY THE BUYER PRESENT
for Stock IN ISOLATION
Note: The table reports by row the possible production modes and by the column the type of cus-
tomization activities performed for each production mode.
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Table 4: A taxonomy of production modes
Low degree of spatial High degree of spatial
clustering (low K) clustering (high K)
Homogeneous PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
industry (low ) TO ORDER IN ADVANCE
Dierentiated PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
industry (high ) IN ADVANCE TO ORDER
Note: The table reports a qualitative taxonomy for the choice of the production mode according to the
degree of product dierentiation (rows) and the degree of spatial clustering (columns).
Table 5: Summary statistics for main variables
Notation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Production to order intensity POIgij 3,515 .730 .403 0 1
Production to order dummy (30% threshold) Ordgij 3,515 .782 .413 0 1
Production to order dummy (50% threshold) Ordgij 3,515 .756 .429 0 1
Spatial clustering dummy (median threshold) Clustgj 3,515 .610 .488 0 1
SITC without org. exch. mkt. (cons. class.; J = 77) zj 3,515 .971 .109 .325 1
SITC without org. exch. mkt. (cons. class.; J = 22) zj 3,515 .946 .102 .620 1
Note: The table reports some summary statistics across rms for the main variable of interest.
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Table 6: The determinants of production to order: Baseline estimation
col1 col2 col3 col4 col5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Clust (median) 0.016 -.463 -.433
(0.015) (0.104) (0.121)
Clust (75 pct.) -.309
(0.118)
Clust (1) -.351
(0.158)
Clust (median) * Cons 0.491 0.463
(0.108) (0.125)
Clust (75 pct.) * Cons 0.325
(0.125)
Clust (1) * Cons 0.388
(0.162)
Share manuf. * Cons -.242 -.310 -.346
(0.471) (0.504) (0.496)
Age (log) 0.106 0.107 0.107
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
Age2 (log) -.018 -.018 -.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Exporter -.019 -.020 -.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Size (log) -.040 -.040 -.040
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Labor Productivity (log) -.026 -.027 -.027
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Capital Intensity (log) -.039 -.039 -.039
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Skill intensity (log) -.009 -.009 -.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Belongs to Group -.007 -.008 -.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LLS xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3,515 3,515 3,438 3,438 3,438
R2 0.235 0.238 0.267 0.265 0.266
Note: Standard errors clustered by industries are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively.
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Table 7: Robustness checks
Ord (30%) Ord (50%) Lib. Classif. Weighted LS Restrict. sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Clust (median) -.400 -.419 -.208 -.394 -.422
(0.107) (0.136) (0.109) (0.109) (0.141)
Clust (median) * Cons 0.425 0.443 0.422 0.456
(0.111) (0.14) (0.113) (0.145)
Clust (median) * Lib 0.239
(0.113)
Share Manuf. * Cons 0.265 -.252 -.267 -.159
(0.503) (0.468) (0.547) (0.648)
Share Manuf. * Lib -.387
(0.365)
Exporter 0.011 0.002 -.019 -.021 -.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Age (log) 0.104 0.115 0.11 0.102 0.097
(0.053) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054) (0.057)
Age2 (log) -.019 -.020 -.019 -.017 -.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Size (log) -.036 -.036 -.040 -.034 -.040
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.011)
Labor Productivity (log) -.040 -.039 -.027 -.026 -.028
(0.02) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Capital Intensity (log) -.035 -.040 -.039 -.039 -.036
(0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01)
Skill Intensity (log) -.009 -.004 -.009 -.005 -.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Belongs to Group -.011 0.001 -.007 -.002 -.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LLS xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3,438 3,438 3,438 3,438 3,124
R2 0.253 0.244 0.266 0.268 0.257
Note: Standard errors clustered by industries are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively.
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Table 8: Alternative industrial classication: 2-digit NACE
POI Ord (30%) Ord (50%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Clust (median) -.207 -.154 -.287 -.208 -.208 -.144
(0.095) (0.075) (0.102) (0.081) (0.087) (0.067)
Clust (median) * Cons 0.256 0.334 0.256
(0.098) (0.105) (0.09)
Clust (median) * Lib 0.208 0.260 0.195
(0.078) (0.085) (0.071)
Share manuf. * Cons -.994 -.818 -.788
(0.662) (0.623) (0.554)
Share manuf. * Lib -.939 -.752 -.751
(0.577) (0.55) (0.484)
Age (log) 0.095 0.096 0.093 0.093 0.105 0.105
(0.067) (0.067) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age2 (log) -.017 -.017 -.017 -.017 -.019 -.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Exporter -.034 -.034 -.003 -.003 -.012 -.012
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Size (log) -.038 -.038 -.034 -.034 -.035 -.034
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Labor Productivity (log) -.028 -.028 -.041 -.041 -.038 -.038
(0.02) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02)
Capital Intensity (log) -.040 -.040 -.036 -.036 -.042 -.041
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Skill Intensity (log) -.010 -.010 -.010 -.009 -.004 -.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Belongs to group -.010 -.010 -.013 -.013 -.002 -.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LLS xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3,438 3,438 3,438 3,438 3,438 3,438
R2 0.236 0.236 0.220 0.220 0.224 0.224
Note: Standard errors clustered by industries are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level respectively.
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Table 9: Concordance table of the industrial classication with NACE Rev. 1
Industrial classication used in the paper NACE Rev. 1
1 Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products 15.1
2 Processing and preserving of sh and sh products; fruit and vegetables 15.2 + 15.3
3 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 15.4
4 Dairy products 15.5
5 Grain mill products, starches and starch products 15.6
6 Prepared animal feeds 15.7
7 Bread, rusks and biscuits; pastry goods and cakes 15.81 + 15.82
8 Sugar 15.83
9 Cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery 15.84
10 Other food products 15.85 to 15.89
11 Alcoholic beverages - alcohol and malt 15.91 to 15.97
12 Production of mineral waters and soft drinks 15.98
13 Tobacco products 16
14 Preparation and spinning of textile bres 17.1
15 Textile weaving 17.2
16 Finishing of textiles 17.3
17 Made-up textile articles, except apparel 17.4
18 Carpets and rugs 17.51
19 Other textiles 17.52 to 17.54
20 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 17.6 + 17.7
21 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 18
22 Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 19.1 + 19.2
23 Footwear 19.3
24 Wood and wood products, except furniture 20
25 Pulp, paper and paperboard 21.1
26 Articles of paper and paperboard 21.2
27 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22
28 Coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
29 Industrial gases, dyes and pigments 24.11 + 24.12
30 Other inorganic basic chemicals 24.13
31 Other organic basic chemicals 24.14
32 Fertilisers and nitrogen compounds 24.15
33 Plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms 24.16 + 24.17
34 Pesticides and other agro-chemical products 24.2
35 Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics 24.3
36 Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 24.4
37 Soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations 24.5
38 Other chemical products 24.6
39 Man-made bres 24.7
40 Rubber products 25.1
41 Plastic products 25.2
42 Glass and glass products 26.1
43 Ceramic goods 26.2 + 26.3
44 Bricks, tiles and construction products in baked clay 26.4
45 Cement, lime and plaster 26.5
46 Articles of concrete, plaster, cement; cutting, shaping, nishing of stone; other non-metallic mineral products 26.6 to 26.8
47 Basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys; manufacture of tubes and other rst processing of iron and steel 27.1 to 27.3
48 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 27.4
49 Casting of metals 27.5
50 Structural metal products 28.1
51 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; central heating radiators and boilers; steam generators 28.2 + 28.3
52 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metallurgy; treatment and coating of metals 28.4 + 28.5
53 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 28.6
54 Other fabricated metal products 28.7
55 Machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines 29.1
56 Other general purpose machinery 29.2
57 Agricultural and forestry machinery 29.3
58 Machine tools 29.4
59 Other special purpose machinery 29.5
60 Weapons and ammunition 29.6
61 Domestic appliances not elsewhere classied 29.7
62 Oce machinery and computers 30
63 Electric motors, generators and transformers; manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 31.1 + 31.2
64 Insulated wire and cable 31.3
65 Electrical equipment not elsewhere classied 31.4 to 31.6
66 Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 32.1
67 Television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy 32.2
68 Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods 32.3
69 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 33
70 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34
71 Building and repairing of ships and boats 35.1
72 Other transport equipment 35.2 + 35.4 + 35.5
73 Aircraft and spacecraft 35.3
74 Furniture 36.1
75 Jewellery and related articles; musical instruments 36.2 + 36.3
76 Sports goods, games and toys 36.4 + 36.5
77 Miscellaneous manufacturing not elsewhere classied; recycling 36.6 + 37
Note: The table provides the concordance between the industrial classication used in the paper and
NACE Rev. 1.
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